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Private Equity Abroad: A Comparative Analysis of Brazil’s Private Equity
Framework and Europe’s Private Equity Framework
Tyler L. Hinton*
I.

Introduction
What is the risk? This question plays a huge roll in every investment decision. Investors

often lose sleep thinking about the potential gains or losses associated with a transaction.
Consequently, investment analysts have deviated from the colloquial meaning of risk, the exposure
to danger, and view risk as any change, positive or negative, from zero.1 In determining the risk
of an investment, analysts most commonly use one of three formulas.2 First, Coefficient of
Variation, which is defined as:
Coefficient of Variation =
̄
Where:
s = Standard Deviation
x̄ = Mean3
Investment analysts use the Coefficient of Variation to calculate the risk per unit of return.4
Accordingly, when comparing the Coefficient of Variation of two investments the investment
with the lower Coefficient of Variation is regarded as preferable because it presents less risk.5
The second formula investment analysts use when assessing risk is the Sharpe Ratio,
which is defined as:
Sharpe Ratio =
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Where:
Rx = Expected Portfolio Return
Rf = Risk Free Rate of Return
StdDev Rx = Portfolio Standard Deviation6
The Sharpe Ratio measures the risk return per unit of risk.7 Accordingly, when comparing the
Sharpe Ratio of two investments the investment with the higher Sharpe Ratio is more desirable
because it indicates a greater return in relation to the level of additional risk taken to incur the
return.8
The last common measure of risk used by investment analysts is the Roy’s Safety First
Ratio, which is defined as:
Roy’s Safety First Ratio =
Where:
Rx = Expected Portfolio Return
Rt = Portfolio Target Return
StdDev Rx = Portfolio Standard Deviation9
Roy’s Safety First Ratio calculates the probability that a portfolio or investment return will fall
below a minimum threshold over a period of time.10 As such, when investment analysts use the
Roy’s Safety First Ratio the portfolio or investment with the higher result is selected because it
indicates a lower probability of a shortfall return.11
Each of the above formulas seeks to quantify the risk of an investment so investors can
make important financial decisions with a greater degree of certainty.12 The formulas use statistics
to best predict the outcome of an investment.13 This is a rational tactic as statistics and investing
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have always gone hand in hand. The intrinsic relationship between risk assessment and statistics
presents an interesting challenge to legislators grappling with the question of how to protect
investors and national markets while simultaneously creating a legal framework that is attractive
to investors that are inherently risk adverse.
The financial crisis gave global regulators new momentum to attempt to regulate
alternative investment funds.14 This newfound energy and eagerness to regulate came from
political institutions that villainized alternative investment vehicles.15 Jurisdictions took many
different approaches in regulating alternative investment vehicles.

Accordingly, the legal

framework surrounding alternative investment funds is complex and varies dramatically from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Moreover, due to globalization, Alternative Investment Fund

Managers (hereinafter AIFMs) worldwide seek to diversify the location of their investments with
the goal of limiting beta risk and achieving returns in excess of the market.16
Behind the United States, Europe is the second leading location for leveraged buyout
transactions.17 Private equity funds that concentrate on emerging markets, however, are focusing

14

Regulators use the term alternative investment fund to extend to the broad context of any pooled investment vehicle
that is privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”
See Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions, 2000. However,
the definition is dated. See Steve Johnson, US hedge Funds move into ‘Newcits’, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013,
https://www.ft.com/content/ca1c625c-fb66-11e2-a641-00144feabdc0.
15
For instance, Guilio Tremonti, the Italian Finance Minister described hedge funds as "hellish" and demanded their
abolishment. See Tracy Corrigan, Hedge Funds Don't Need Punishing - They are Suffering Enough, THE
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finanee/comment/tracycorrigan/3212102/Hedgefundsdont-need-punishing-they-are-suffering-enough.html.
16
Returns above the market rate of return are common referred to as Alpha. See generally CFA INSTITUTE, supra
note 1, at 86.
17
Some have argued that Europe will lose a significant portion of its private equity business once the United
Kingdom exits the EU. However, others have asserted a secondary argument that funds will move to Ireland and
continue business as usual. See Michael Collins, Brexit and Private Equity: Why Suspense is Worse Than
Disappointment,
INVEST
EUROPE
(Mar.
23
2018),
https://www.investeurope.eu/newsopinion/opinion/blog/2018/brexit-and-private-equity-why-suspense-is-worse-than-disappointment/.
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less on developing economies in Europe18 and looking more towards Brazil, Latin America’s
largest economy.19 This shift is due to a unique set of regulations implemented by the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (hereinafter CVM)) that
makes Brazil a prime target for any alternative investment fund seeking to operate in an emerging
market.
This Comment seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it seeks to offer a comparative
assessment of the legal framework governing private equity funds in Brazil and the European
Union, as well as the regulations United States domiciled investors face when seeking to invest in
the either of the above jurisdictions. As this comparative examination will reveal, private equity
is subject to particularly stringent requirements in Europe, both on a transactional level and,
subsequent to the adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter
AIFMD), a fund manager level. It will also show that the European regulatory environment is
starkly different from Brazil because Brazil, when enacting its regulatory framework, purposely
took a contrasting approach to make it a desirable jurisdiction for private equity.20 Second, this
Comment will propose modifications to both Brazil and Europe’s current legal frameworks to
improve each jurisdiction’s ability to facilitate foreign private equity investments.
II.

History and Explanation of Private Equity
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (hereinafter KKR) raised the first private equity fund

to finance leveraged buyouts. Now, private equity firms are the new kings of capitalism.21 Fueled

18

Many Eastern European Nations, such as Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Turkey, are characterized
as emerging markets. See, e.g., MSCI Emerging Markets Europe Index, Sept. 2018 Report,
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/1cf0a2d6-48fa-4c69-b397-b0faa3fc6e5c (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
19
The World Bank, Latin Am. And Caribbean Econ. Data 2018: Brazil (last visited Feb. 11, 2019),
https://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil.
20
See infra parts Part 144.
21
See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE D. SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALIST: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND
THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 59 (1998).

5
by an abundance of liquidity in the financial system, private equity reached its peak between 2003
and 2007.22 This golden era ended when the housing bubble burst and the credit crisis emerged.
These two factors caused the collapse of the private equity market as bidders tried to terminate or
renegotiate their pending acquisitions.23 Private equity struggled to recover through the early
2010s. This struggle was attributed to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe24 as well as fragile debt
markets. These factors, along with others, strained deal financing and evidenced the dependency
of private equity activity on credit market conditions.25 With some of the world’s largest deals
financed by private equity, however, it arguably has made a full recovery.26
Since the origins of the modern private equity industry in 1946, there have been four epochs
marked by three boom and bust cycles. The early history of private equity, from 1946 through
1981, is characterized by relatively small volumes of private equity investment, rudimentary firm
organizations, and limited awareness of, and familiarity with, the private equity industry.27
The first boom and bust cycle (from 1982 through 1993) is remembered by the dramatic
surge in leveraged buyout activity financed by junk bonds. This period culminated with the
massive buyout of RJR Nabisco before the near collapse of the leveraged buyout industry in the

22

The
Economist,
The
New
Kings
of
Capitalism,
ECONOMIST,
Nov.
25,
2004,
http://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/special-reports-pdfs/3398415.pdf.
23
Matthew D. Cain et al. Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic
Default 2 (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1540000.
24
While some nations in Europe have recovered from the sovereign debt crisis, Italy still faces major issues. In fact,
Italy’s new budget plan—which has been endorsed by its government—will widen its deficit to 2.4% of Gross
Domestic Product (“GDP”). This proposed increase is in defiance of the EU rules. Giovanni Legorano, Italy’s
Government Endorses Draft Budget That Would Widen Deficit: Coalition of Antiestablishment 5 Star Movement and
the Far-Right League Backs Law in Defiance of EU Rules; Full Version Must Now Pass Parliament, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
15,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/italys-government-endorses-draft-budget-that-would-widen-deficit1539636894.
25
JOHN AUTHERS, EUROPE’S FINANCIAL CRISIS, 155 (2012).
26
Paul J. Davis, Private Equity: So Hot Even Second-Hand Funds Can Sell at a Premium, WALL ST. J. (June 25,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-equity-so-hot-even-second-hand-funds-can-sell-at-a-premium1529924400.
27
The Economist, supra note 22.
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late 1980s and early 1990s.28 The second boom and bust cycle (from 1992 through 2002) emerged
from the ashes of the savings and loan crisis, insider trading scandals, the real estate market
collapse and the recession of the early 1990s.29

This period saw the emergence of more

institutionalized private equity firms, ultimately culminating in the massive Dot-com bubble in
1999 and 2000.30
The third boom and bust cycle (from 2003 through 2007) came in the wake of the collapse
of the Dot-com bubble, at this point in history leveraged buyouts (hereinafter LBOs) reached an
unparalleled size and private equity was crowned the new kings of capitalism shortly after
the Blackstone Group's 2007 initial public offering.31 In the early years through to roughly the
year 2000, the private equity and venture capital asset classes were primarily active in the United
States. With the second private equity boom in the mid-1990s and liberalized regulations for
institutional investors in Europe, however, a mature European private equity market emerged.
i.

How Private Equity Works

Private equity is a generic term encompassing a wide variety of investments.

The

customary characteristic of private equity investments is illiquidity since private equity involves
unregistered securities.32 Private equity includes venture capital, development capital, mezzanine
capital, LBOs, and distressed investing.33
Venture capital funds provide financing to start-ups and early-stage firms, thereby
contributing to macroeconomic growth and job creation.34 Development capital involves the

28

Sarah Bartlett, History of the RJR Nabisco Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1988, at D15.
The Economist, supra note 22.
30
Id.
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Id.
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JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
TRANSACTIONS 1-11 (2017).
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Id. at 1–10.
34
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provision of funds to existing companies to support their expansion.35 Mezzanine funds provide
financing to LBOs in the form of subordinated debt, with equity participation in the form of
warrants to subscribe for shares in the borrower.36 Distressed debt investors purchase debt of
troubled companies at a discount, and then use their rights as debtholders to promote a restructuring
of the company.37
Private equity investments are channeled through specialized intermediaries that are
usually organized as limited partnerships, commonly known as private equity funds.38 Private
equity firms such as KKR, GS Capital Partners, the private equity arm of Goldman Sachs and
Blackstone periodically establish private equity funds in the form of limited partnerships where
they serve as general partners.39 The general partner is responsible for managing the fund.
Furthermore, the general partner solicits capital from investors, who become limited partners of
these funds.40 The principal investors in private equity funds are generally institutional investors
such as pension funds, university endowments, insurance companies, and banks.

Wealthy

individuals, however, have also been known to invest in these funds.41
III.

Private Equity Law in Europe
Since the 2008 financial crisis, private equity funds and hedge funds have been subject to

an increase in global regulation,42 even though no study has directly linked the 2008 financial crisis
to such entities.43 The United States of America became the first nation to pass major financial

35

Id. at 1–7.
Id. at 1–5.
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Id. at 1–8.
38
See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., STAFF SERIES 168, THE ECON. OF THE
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET, 28 (1995).
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See Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW 133, 136 (2003).
40
See Per Strömberg, The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research Findings
4 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429322.
41
See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008).
42
Yogi Dewan, There are Too Many Hedge Fund Billionaires, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015.
43
The famous De Larosière Report dated February 25, 2009, deemed that alternative investment funds (hedge funds
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market reform that targets private equity funds and other alternative investment vehicles.44 Shortly
thereafter, the European Commission passed Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament
and the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives, 2011 O.J. L
174/1 (hereinafter AIFMD). The goal of AIFMD was to regulate private equity funds, and other
investment vehicles, throughout Europe in a uniform and comprehensive manner for the first time
in the history of the European Union.45
Prior to Europe implementing the AIFMD, there was no direct European legislation
regulating Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter AIFs), including private equity funds.
Instead, financial service providers were subject to numerous European State regulations that
aimed to control various aspects of the financial service industry. Despite the post 2008 European
Union directives trying to bring uniform regulations to financial markets, a political divide
emerged between the European member states embracing a market-shaping paradigm and those
embracing a market-making paradigm.46 The countries adopting the market-making paradigm find
value in competition, market efficiency and financial innovation.47 Whereas the countries that
favored the market-shaping paradigm favored investor protection, equal access to the markets, and
financial stability.48

and private equity funds) didn’t play a major part in creating the crisis. However, they did play a part in worsening it
by massive selling of shares and short-selling transactions of distressed entities. See JACQUES DE LAROSIÈRE, THE
HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 24 (2009).
44
On July 21, 2010, former President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173, commonly referred to as Dodd–Frank) into American Federal Law.
45
Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and
amending Directives, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC) [hereinafter AIFMD]; See AUTHERS, supra note 25, at 155.
46
Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union, 34:4 W.
EUR. POL. 665, 666–82 (2011).
47
Id. at 667–80.
48
Id. at 666–79.
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The United Kingdom and Ireland are the strongest advocates for the market-making
paradigm, while the market-shaping paradigm received support from the Mediterranean countries
and, in several instances, Germany.49 In fact, even prior to the financial crisis, the long-standing
goal of the advocates of the market-shaping paradigm was to regulate private funds.50 Several
member states instituted national regulatory regimes, which typically involved registration
requirements and oversight of private equity fund managers, as well as structural separation of the
fund manager and the custodian.51 Nevertheless, these regulations were fairly rudimentary and
did not address the complexity of private equity funds.
The financial crisis gave the EU new momentum in its attempt to regulate private equity
funds. Regulators villainized private equity funds that took part in credit default swaps and
demonized those fund managers who profited from the crash. But the crisis did not substantially
alter the configuration of interests concerning private equity fund regulation in the EU.52 Those
concerns were present and known long before the financial crisis.53 The newfound momentum to
regulate private equity funds, however, did impinge upon existing regulatory paradigms because
it was seen as implicitly validating the market-shaping approach exposed by the pro-regulation
countries.54 European Parliament produced several reports on the rationale for regulating private
equity funds, and it hinted at the possibility of established parameters as the regulatory atmosphere
was starting to focus on specific regulations aimed at alternative investment funds.55

49

Id. at 667–82.
Id. at 670–82.
51
DIRK ZETZSCHE ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE 157 (2d ed. 2015).
52
Id. at 155.
53
Quaglia, supra note 46.
54
See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
55
See, e.g., European Parliament, Report of the European Parliament with Recommendations to the Commission on
Hedge Funds and Private Equity, A6-0338/2008 (2008); European Parliament, Report of the European Parliament
with Recommendations to the Commission on Transparency of Institutional Investors, A6-0296/2008 (2008).
50
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The political motivations of Germany and France, backed by some members of the
European Parliament, were the driving forces in the redesign of EU regulations on closed-ended
funds56. France and Germany’s actions were motivated by institutionally shaped economic
interests,57 as well as their market-shaping regulatory approach with regards to financial services.
Further, the global financial crisis also influenced the new regulatory environment because it
discredited the “British Model”, which was the established regulatory model in the EU since the
late 1990s.58
In adopting new financial regulations, the EU followed the redesigned regulatory process
called ‘Lamfalussy’ approach.59 The ‘Lamfalussy’ regulatory approach is a four-level approach
to implementing new financial regulations. At level 1, the European Parliament and Council adopt
the basic laws proposed by the Commission using the traditional co-decision procedure. This
procedure is usually complex and time-consuming. Thus, the ‘Lamfalussy’ approach only uses
level one for setting out framework principles.60
At level 2, the Commission can adopt, adapt, and update technical implementing measures
with the help of consultative bodies composed mainly of EU countries representatives. The three
European supervisory/consultant authorities that aid in the implementation of new financial
standards are the European Banking Authority (hereinafter EBA), the European Securities and
Markets Authority (hereinafter ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions

56

See ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 159.
See id. at 159–60.
58
See id. at 160–62.
59
See The European Commission, Regulatory Process in Financial Services: Lamfalussy Architecture, (Feb. 10, 2019,
5:04
PM),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-reforms-and-theirprogress/regulatory-process-financial-services/regulatory-process-financial-services_it.
60
Id.
57
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Authority (hereinafter EIOPA). This allows the Council and Parliament to focus on key political
decisions.61
At level 3, committees of national supervisors are responsible for advising the Commission
in the adoption of level 1 and 2 acts and for issuing guidelines on the implementation of the rules.
The applicable supervisory/consultant authority is charged with drafting both regulatory technical
standards (hereinafter RTS), which are adopted by the Commission by a delegated act, and
implementing technical standards (hereinafter ITS), which are adopted by an implementing act.62
At level 4, the applicable supervisory/consultant authority is charged with ensuring the correct
enforcement of EU rules by national governments.63
Under this process, the European Commission may adopt measures as binding technical
standards that are implemented into law through by the member states.64 The standards set forth
by the European Commission act as the minimal requirements placed on the member states, and
individual member states can modify language and impose greater regulations if they choose.
Regardless, before the European Commission can issue a binding directive on the member states,
the European Parliament and Council may raise objections to the delegated act and halt the
legislative process.
On June 8, 2011, the European Parliament and Council used the Lamfalussy approach to
pass the AIFMD.65 ESMA is the European supervisory/consultant authority responsible for
advising the Commission on the adoption of both regulatory technical standards and implementing

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
The European Commission is an institution of the European Union, responsible for proposing legislation,
implementing decisions, upholding the EU treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the EU.
65
See Generally AIFMD.
62
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technical standards for the AIFMD.66 When ESMA’s advisory powers are applied to the AIFMD,
ESMA has significant control over how the AIFMD is interpreted and applied to the member
states. This latitude comes from the highly technical nature of the AIFMD and the broad and
intentionally ambiguous language of the directive itself.67
The AIFMD is Europe’s attempt to regulate the private equity industry and create a
regulatory scheme that applies to all AIF managers conducting business in Europe. For example,
it applies to EU AIF managers managing one or more EU AIFs, or non-EU AIFs. It also applies
to non-EU AIF managers managing or marketing one or more EU AIFs. Further, the AIFMD
applies to non-EU AIF managers marketing non-EU AIFs in the EU.68 The only scenario where
AIF managers fall outside the scope of the AIFMD is when no relationship with the EU exists,
such as a non-EU AIF manager managing and/or marketing a non-EU AIF outside the EU.69 The
AIFMD regulates how an AIF is authorized, and it prescribes the operating conditions of the fund,
including remuneration requirements, valuation, risk-management requirements, liquidity
requirements, delegation rules, and depositary requirements. The AIFMD further places increased
transparency requirements on AIFs, implements special provisions on leverage, and most
importantly, controls how an AIF manager can market its fund within the EU and to its citizens.
The section below will examine the parts of the AIFMD that have the greatest impact on
Private Equity investing in the EU. Each of the topics will be examined in detail. In particular,
this section will focus on the AIFMD’s marketing requirements, the AIFMD’s anti-asset
stripping provisions and a few additional restrictions found in the AIFMD.

66

See ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 165.
ESMA is very similar to the SEC and FINRA, however it lacks an enforcement mechanism, its sole purpose is to
promulgate rules.
68
AIFMD, art. II § (1)(a)-(c).
69
See Generally ASSOCIATION OF THE LUXEMBOURG FUND INDUSTRY, ANNUAL REPORT 2013-2014, 12–54 (June 19,
2014).
67
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i.

Marketing Requirements

First and foremost, investing in any fund that is subject to the AIFMD is only available
to “qualified investors.” Each member state makes the determination as to what criteria must
be met by an investor to be considered a “qualified investor.”70 If a fund subject to the AIFMD
markets its products or engages in business with an investor who is not deemed a qualified
investor under the applicable law, the AIF and AIFM may be subject to civil penalties as
determined by the jurisdiction in which the unqualified investor resides.
Article 67 of the AIFMD creates the EU wide marketing passport. Currently, the
marketing passport is only available to AIFs that are created in the EU and managed by EU
domiciled managers. Under Article 67, a European Union domiciled AIF manager must notify
its home state regulatory agency of its desire to become a passport marketing fund. This is done
by filing a notification that includes the following information: (a) The AIF rules; (b) The
identification of the depository; (c) Information on the AIF which is available to investors, and
when relevant; (d) Information on arrangements to prevent the AIF from being marketed to retail
investors.71
Upon receipt of this information, the AIFs home state may either grant or deny the fund’s
registration. If the fund becomes registered, the AIFs’ home state regulatory agency is required to
send a notification to all other member states certifying that the fund is registered and allowed to
actively market itself throughout the EU. This notification must be made within 20 days of the

70

Compare Loi n° 2003-706 du 1 août 2008 de sécurité financière [Law 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003 on the Financial
Security] J.O. 177, Aug. 2, 2003, p. 760 (Fr) (stating to be a qualified investor in France one must have personal
wealth of at least 500,000 Euro) with European Union (Alternative Investment Fund Managers) Regulations 2013 (SI
257/2013) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/si/257/made/en/print (Article 42 states that an Irish
professional investor is defined as an investor who demonstrates knowledge and expertise to make investment
decisions, understands investment risks, and can meet the €100,000.00 subscription requirement). The terms
professional investor, qualified investor and institutional investor are used interchangeably depending on the
jurisdiction.
71
See AIFMD, art. LXVII (hereinafter AIFMD art. 67).
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AIFs’ registration.72 After the twenty-day period has lapsed, the AIF can market itself throughout
Europe and need not register with any other state regulatory agency.73
Currently, the EU wide marketing passport is only available to EU AIFs with EU AIF
managers. ESMA was required to issue an opinion as to whether the AIFMD marketing passport
should be extended to non-EU AIFs and non-EU AIF managers,74 but this opinion has been
delayed due to the EU’s negotiations with the United Kingdom regarding Brexit.

75

Based on

earlier and conflicting ESMA advisory opinions, it is uncertain if the AIFMD marketing passport
will be extended to non-EU AIFs.76 Article 67 of the AIFMD imposes substantial restrictions on
how a fund can market itself in the EU.
ii.

Anti-Asset Stripping

The greatest impact of the AIFMD in the private equity sector has been through its asset
stripping rules. The rules were designed to restrict the ability of Private Equity Funds to extract

72

See id.
See id.
74
See id.
75
See BNP Paribas, Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) - Regulation Memo, Q2 Reg. Memo
2018 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://securities.bnpparibas.com/insights/aifmd-regulatory-memo-2018.html.
76
While most experts think it is likely that ESMA will extend the EU-wide marketing passport to non-EU AIFs in
2018. See European Securities and Markets Authority, European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the
Application of the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs, 2016 EMSA MEMO 1140 (Sept. 12, 2016) (indicating that it
is likely passport marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); See also European
Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the
application of the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (Jul. 18, 2016) (indicating that it is likely passport
marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); European Securities and Markets
Authority, ESMA’s advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of the
AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (Jul. 30, 2015) (indicating that it is likely passport marketing will be
extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); European Securities and Markets Authority, Letter from
the European Commission to the European Securities and Markets Authority (Dec. 17, 2015) (indicating that it is
likely passport marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations to certain countries
including the United States and the Cayman Islands). Due to the power given to ESMA to make decisions regarding
the AIFMD, it is still not certain if ESMA will extend the EU wide marketing passport to non-EU AIFs. Even though
ESMA is required to issue an advisory opinion by 2018, ESMA can say that global regulations and market conditions
are still not ripe enough to make this determination. Thereby pushing the possible extension of the EU-wide marketing
passport to a later date.
73
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funds in the first two years of ownership, following an AIF taking control of an unlisted company.77
Specifically, the rules are (1) the portfolio company is not allowed to undertake any distribution
(including dividends on shares), capital reduction, share redemption and/or acquisition of own
shares, (2) the AIF cannot vote in favor of a distribution, capital reduction, share redemption and/or
acquisition of own shares by the company, and (3) in any event, the AIF should use its best effort
to prevent distributions, capital reductions, share redemptions and/or acquisition of own shares by
the company.78
The rules apply to restrict distributions of pre-acquisition profits—in other words, to avoid
reducing a company’s value by asset stripping.79 Where a fund is subject to the AIFMD asset
stripping restrictions, it is imperative to confirm that any planned extractions of funds are permitted
under the rules. The obvious circumstances in which this may apply are: (1) Up-streaming cash
to service debt; (2) Repatriation of cash via regular dividend streams; and (3) Returning cash to
investors in partial disposals via dividend recapitalizations.80
In restricting an AIF’s ability to engage in asset stripping, the AIFMD limits the desire for
distressed debt investors to participate in the European market.81 One of the earliest functions of
private equity funds is acquiring corporate debt and using the resulting security interests to ensure

77

Control means having over 50% of voting rights in a private company or 30% of voting in a listed company (a
different figure may apply elsewhere in the EEA). See AIFMD art. XXVI (hereinafter AIFMD, art. 26).
78
See AIFMD, art. XXX (hereinafter AIFMD, art. 30).
79
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https://www.rpc.co.uk/perspectives/corporate-insurance-and-financial-services/private-equity-acquisitions--assetstripping-rules/.
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corporate assets are being used efficiently to create value.82 If the assets the AIF has a security
interest in are creating losses and the corporation is delinquent in servicing its debt, the AIFM
would either sell the assets by influencing the board of directors, or foreclose on the debt forcing
the corporation to sell the assets to repay the AIF.83 The anti-asset stripping provision was put into
place by the European Commission due to a large number of takeovers that occurred in Eastern
Europe with the sole purpose of selling the existing company for parts.84 Often, such behavior
resulted in layoffs. 85
iii.

Disclosure to Investors

AIFMs must disclose general information to investors regarding the: (1) financial and nonfinancial criteria of the remuneration policies; (2) practices for relevant categories of staff to enable
investors to assess the incentives created; and (3) the requirements in relation to the type of
information to be made available to investors will generally be information familiar to any
investment fund managers.86 The AIFMD, however, includes additional disclosure requirements
such as: (1) Disclosure on insurance coverage for professional liability risks; (2) Details of any
preferential treatment of investors, the type of investors who obtain such preferential treatment
and their legal or economic links to the AIF or AIFM; (3) The percentage of AIF assets subject to
special arrangements due to their illiquid nature and details of the special arrangements; and (4)
Any changes to the maximum leverage that the AIFM may employ on behalf of the AIF, as well
as any right of the reuse of collateral or any guarantee granted under the leveraging arrangement.87
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iv.

Annual Report

The annual report to be provided to investors must comply with disclosure requirements,
which will generally be familiar to fund managers. Nevertheless, AIFMs will also be required to
include additional disclosures including: (1) Any material changes during the financial year; (2)
The total amount of remuneration paid to AIFM staff for the financial year (fixed and variable)
number of beneficiaries, and any carried interest; and (3) The aggregate remuneration (broken
down by senior management and staff of the AIFM whose actions have a material impact on risk
profile of the AIF).88 While self-evident, an increase in reporting requirements directly correlates
with the cost an AIFM must spend on compliance and directly impacts the profitability of the
venture.
v.

Reporting to Competent Authorities

AIFMs are also required to provide certain information on a regular basis to the supervisors
of the member state in which each AIF is marketed.89 The reporting must be in template format
and include the following:90 (1) The principal markets and instruments traded by it on behalf of
the AIF; (2) The percentage of AIF assets subject to special arrangements arising from their illiquid
nature, arrangements for managing liquidity, the risk management systems employed, the current
risk profile of the fund, the main categories of assets invested in, and the results of stress tests
performed in line with the AIFM Directive; (3) An annual report of the AIF and upon request, a
list of all funds managed by the AIFM at the end each quarter; and (4) Where substantial leverage
is employed, information on the overall level of leverage employed.91
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vi.

Leverage

Leverage is defined in the Directive as: “any method by which the AIFM increases the
exposure of an AIF it manages, whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or leverage
embedded in derivative positions or by any other means.”92
The definition is potentially extremely broad. Clearly, straight cash borrowings of any type
are included, but leverage will also include (1) convertible borrowings, (2) swaps, options and
forwards, and (3) repurchasing agreement (repos) and reverse repos93 and securities lending
arrangements.94 The definition itself does not differentiate between secured and unsecured
borrowing or on the basis of duration, rates, terms or purpose.95 It is quite possible that private
fund structures may find themselves employing leverage, whether borrowing for investment, using
hedging arrangements or perhaps bridging drawdowns.96 The regulatory focus is on exposure.97
The European Commission’s Delegated Regulation (commonly known as the “Level 2
Regulation”) expresses leverage as “the ratio between the exposure of an AIF and its net asset
value.”98
The Level 2 Regulation requires leverage to be calculated using two bases: (1) the gross
method—the sum of the absolute values of all positions, so as to give an indication of overall
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exposure; and (2) the commitment method—the sum of the absolute values of all positions (with
no setting permitted), adjusted for various factors, including the application of netting and hedging
arrangements.99 Note, though, that certain types of leverage can be excluded. There are two
exclusions that may be particularly important for the private funds sector. The first exclusion is
leverage in Portfolio Companies where an AIF’s core investment policy is the acquisition of
control over non-listed companies or issuers (i.e. most private equity). Under these circumstances
the AIFM can exclude any leverage used in making such investments that would otherwise have
an impact on the maximum leverage requirement prescribed by the AIFMD.100 Additionally, when
the above set of facts exists in an AIF, neither the AIF nor the AIFM has to bear potential losses
beyond its investment in the relevant company.101 The second exclusion is Drawdown Facilities
where an AIFM can exclude temporary borrowing arrangements if they are fully covered by
contractual capital commitments from investors in the AIF. Neither of these exclusions, however,
are completely clear-cut.102
IV.

Private Equity Law in Brazil, The FIP
Brazilian law does not provide for limited liability partnerships (LLPs) or limited

partnerships (LPs), and until recently, private equity investments in Brazil were predominantly
structured through holding companies. From a legal standpoint, the intensification of private
equity activity has prompted investors and governmental authorities to devise creative
transactional structures and regulatory approaches that facilitate private equity ventures and
manage the demands and challenges of an increasingly competitive market.

99

European Security and Market Authority, Questions and Answers Application of the AIFMD, 1873 ESMA 1, 23–
26 (Dec. 15, 2015).
100
EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKET AUTHORITY, supra note 96.
101
Id.
102
Koen van der Veer et al., supra note 98.

20
The result of this interaction has been instrumental in reshaping the Brazilian Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) landscape. These classic private equity transactions—formally implemented
through direct acquisitions/investments or through local holdings incorporated as a limited liability
company (sociedade limitada)103 or corporation (sociedade por ações (S.A.))104—are now
gradually making way for structures involving domestic investment funds as the vehicle to acquire
or invest, hold, and manage portfolio companies until divestment is completed.105
The most popular private equity vehicle in the Brazilian M&A practice is the FIP, whose
structure bears some similarity to the partnership fund model generally adopted in the U.S. and
Europe. The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, CVM, introduced FIPs in Brazil
through Rule No. 391 (CVM Rule 391/03), issued on July 16, 2003.106 By laying down the legal
and regulatory grounds for the establishment of an investment conduit that local and foreign
investors formerly lacked when sponsoring private equity ventures in Brazil, CVM Rule 391/03
largely contributed to a rapid expansion of FIPs in M&A deals.107 More importantly, investments
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and exit strategies successfully implemented by FIPs since 2004 created an encouraging track
record that helped Brazilian private equity-backed M&A transactions achieve high priority on the
agendas of institutional investors.108
The regulatory flexibility and generally favorable tax regime accorded to FIPs make FIPs
a unique and powerful tool for structuring M&A transactions involving targets in Brazil.109
Additionally, investors can utilize FIPs for fundraising, financing, and implementing exit
strategies, as applicable CVM regulations allow the placement of their units in the market.110
CVM Rule 391/03 is the core regulation applicable to FIPs. The self-contained and
investor-friendly legal regime applicable to FIPs makes it the preferred and most flexible private
equity vehicle in Brazil.111 The adaptability of the FIP allows investors to contractually stipulate
the most suitable set of governing and operational rules that will regulate the FIP and the legal
interaction as owners of the vehicle.112 These rules are customarily amalgamated in the FIP’s
charter, quota holders agreements, investment commitment agreements and a variety of service
contracts that regulate matters bearing on the FIP’s investment policy, decision-making
procedures, capital commitments and calls, issuance and placement of units (quotas), distribution
of proceeds, investment and divestment periods, minimum net equity requirements, management
and performance fees, and liquidation.113
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i.

Form and Ownership Structure

In essence, the FIP is a collective investment vehicle formed as a condominium, allowing
co-ownership of assets to be exercised among investors.114 FIPs can only operate in Brazil upon
registration with the CVM.115 Additionally, the FIPs, along with their securities (quotas) and
investors (quota holders), are subject to the CVM’s oversight.116 The FIP must be organized as a
closed-end condominium consisting of an un-personified pool of assets managed and represented
by an administrator registered with the CVM.117
The FIP form can be especially attractive to private equity investors seeking lower
individual exposure to risks through the gathering of funds by an investor pool and asset
diversification.118 The FIP can also provide its owners with a platform for centralized professional
management of target companies with the requisite market and financial skills that otherwise
would not be available to investors acting individually or through subsidiaries.119 Additionally,

114

Under Brazilian law, a condominium can be defined as a joint property (in rem) right exercised by two or more
persons over a certain asset or pool of assets, each holder (a co-owner or condômino) owning a pro rata fraction of
such asset. The condominium itself has no legal personality apart from that of its owners, and the Brazilian Civil Code
(Lei [Law] No. 10,406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 11.1.2002 (Braz.), as amended) sets forth its central legal
tenets. Statutes and regulations have elaborated on the legal concept of condominium to develop various legal
structures, such as joint ownership of common areas of residential and commercial buildings and, most importantly
for the purposes of this Article, quotas (securities) of mutual funds regulated by the CVM. For a further discussion of
FIP’s quotas.
115
CVM Regulation No. 325/00 requires all FIPs to register and submit its charter to the CVM. See Flesch & Prado,
supra note 105, at 89–90; BUREAU OF ECON., ENERGY, AND BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 2011
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – BRAZIL (March 2011).
116
See generally CVM Rule 391/03.
117
A close-ended fund (condominium, if the fund is located in Brazil) is an investment vehicle, in which units can
only be redeemed at the end of the funds’ term, except in the case of liquidation of the fund. However, distributions
can generally be made to quota holders throughout the term of the fund and pursuant to its organizational documents.
See ELROY DIMSON & CAROLINA MINO-PALUELLO, THE CLOSED-END FUND DISCOUNT 1-2 (Bette A. Collins et al.
eds. 2002).
118
See generally Fernando J Prado Ferreira & José Paulo Pimentel Duarte, Brazil, in THE ASSET MANAGEMENT
REVIEW 90 (Paul Dickson et al. eds., LAW & BUS. RES. LTD., 5th ed. 2016).
119
See supra Part 114 and note 114 and accompanying text (so long as providing the aforementioned services is not
prohibited by the terms of the service contract, there is no CVM rule or other regulation prohibiting a FIPs from
engaging in said activity).

23
Brazilian civil and tax law requires the FIP to obtain a federal taxpayer number and to book any
transactions it undertakes in its own name and on its own behalf.120
ii.

Ownership Rights and Quotas

Equity units known as “quotas” represent the ownership interest rights of the FIP’s
investors, or quota holders.121 Each quota in a FIP corresponds to a ratable share of the portfolio
assets held under joint ownership by the quota holders.122 Thus, the value of each quota is
calculated by dividing the net equity of the FIP by the number of outstanding quotas. Each quota
carries one vote at the quota holders’ general meeting, unless the FIPs organizational documents
admit classes of quotas with different voting rights.123
iii.

Permitted Investments

The FIP’s investments are primarily comprised of the acquisition of stock, debentures,
subscription warranties, or other securities convertible into or exchangeable for stock issued by
publicly held (listed) or closely held corporations in Brazil whose management must be actively
monitored by the FIP.124 The remaining portion of the FIP’s portfolio may consist of liquid fixedincome instruments and other financial assets, mainly for cash management purposes.125 The FIP’s
charter must establish the eligibility criteria that apply to publicly held companies that the FIP
invests in.126
Publicly and closely held corporations are also subject to the minimum set of corporate
governance standards imposed by CVM Rule 391/03. Closely held companies that the FIP invests

120

FIPs are also required to register with the National Register of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa
Jurídica (CNPJ)). See Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81–84.
121
See, e.g., Busin & Abreu, supra note 111, at 10–11; Kevin R. Horvath, supra note 108; Eduardo Paoliello, supra
note 117, at 55–57.
122
See, e.g., Busin & Abreu, supra note 111, at 10–12; Eduardo Paoliello, supra note 117, at 55–58.
123
See Ferreira & Duarte, supra note 118, at 90–93.
124
See Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81, 84–86.
125
See id. at 81.
126
See CVM Regulation No. 325/00; Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81, 89–90.

24
in must comply with certain minimum governance guidelines such as: (1) The establishment of a
unified one-year term of office for the entire board of directors (no staggered boards); (2) Annual
audit of their financial statements; (3) Disclosure of related-party agreements, shareholders’
agreements, stock option plans, and share buyback plans; and (4) The obligation to adhere to
certain differentiated levels of corporate governance practices in case the company goes public.127
If a FIP chooses to invest in either a closely held or publicly held company, the investment
is not subject to net worth requirements or minimum review.128

Moreover, no mandatory

diversification requirements or concentration requirements apply to the allocation of the FIP’s
portfolio, unless the FIPs charter states otherwise.129 Additionally, the FIP can place its entire net
equity in a single investment or it may distribute its investments over as many targets as it desires,
so long as the charter is not violated.130 Lastly, there are no restrictions on the number of FIPs that
can invest in a single entity.131
iv.

Investment Restrictions

The modalities of investment funding are: (1) The traditional funding132; (2) Mezzanine;133
and (3) Private investment in public equity (“PIPE”).134 It is the nature of this instrument to
reinvest capital in new businesses without any distribution of income to shareholders. The purpose
is to raise the market value of the asset for a possible sale, either in the promotion of new business
or in the recovery of illiquid assets. Its characteristic is illiquidity.135 The CVM rule limits FIP's
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investments in liquid assets to 10% of net equity.136 The remaining 90% must be invested in (1)
shares, (2) subscription warrants, (3) simple debentures, (4) other securities convertible or
exchangeable into shares issued by publicly or privately held companies, or (5) titles and securities
representing participation in limited liability companies.137
Additionally, The FIP cannot invest in derivatives, except for hedging purposes.138
Furthermore, only the invested companies that make up the FIP’s portfolio may hold direct
ownership in real estate assets, not the FIP itself.139 As a result, when FIPs are used as the vehicle
to invest in real estate, “the invested companies held by the FIP are generally the ones either
directly holding the real estate assets or investing in Special Purpose Companies (SPCs), which
will then hold the real estate assets.”140
The CVM placed some limits on FIPs. One major limit is that FIPs are not allowed to
invest in any foreign venture.141

Additionally, the CVM restricts FIPs from soliciting or

contracting loans (except under very specific limited circumstances) and providing guarantees.142
Regardless, “holding companies or SPCs that the FIP invests in can be used as vehicles in
leveraged acquisitions of, or investments in, target companies.”143
v.

Eligible Investors

Nearly all jurisdictions worldwide recognize that risks associated with private equity
investments are much greater than investments in public markets.144 Accordingly, nearly every
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jurisdiction limits private equity investing to qualified investors only145 because the risks
associated with such investments make them unsuitable for the general public.146 As for FIPs
specifically, typical risks involve: (a) Illiquidity of the securities and assets making up the FIP’s
portfolio (as opposed to other investments in more liquid asset classes); (b) Concentration in
securities issued by only a few target companies or by target companies pertaining to given
industries or sectors; (c) Failure to comply with the investment policy due to the lack of eligible
targets; (d) Other risks particularly related to the target companies, including a spectrum of
business, financial, and legal risks and contingencies; (e) Risks related to the management and
operation of the FIP; and (f) Market and credit risks.147 CVM Rule 391/03 recognizes the risks
inherent in private equity investing and limits investment into FIPs to those who are financially
capable and possess the financial sophistication sufficient to make informed decisions.
CVM Rule 391/03 sets the FIPs minimum capital commitment per quota holder at 100,000
Brazilian Reals. Hence, only “qualified investors” as defined by the CVM, can acquire the quotas
of a FIP. This target investor restriction gives investors great latitude in structuring FIPs and
regulating their operation in accordance with the rules suited for each deal or set of deals.
Moreover, non-resident investors must make the required investment in accordance with the rules
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of Resolution No. 2,689, issued by the National Monetary Council (CMN) on January 26, 2000,
which apply in addition to the prerequisites of CVM Rule 391/03.148
vi.

Active Participation in the Management of Target

CVM Rule 391/03 requires the FIP to actively participate in the invested companies’
strategic policies and management, notably by appointing members to their boards of directors.
The requirement to actively participate in the decision-making process of the target companies and
influence their strategy and management is one of the core features that is unique to FIPs and is
especially attractive to private equity investors.149
Under CVM Rule 391/01, the FIP must retain some degree of effective influence in the
invested companies’ strategic decisions, regardless of how the FIP invests in the target company.
In order to satisfy the investment eligibility test, the FIP may: (a) Hold stocks that are part of the
controlling block of the invested company; (b) Enter into shareholder agreements granting it
discretionary powers over the invested company; or (c) Enter into other agreements or
arrangements that ensure the FIP’s actual influence over strategic policy and management of the
invested company.150
vii.

Management and Governance

In contrast to the partnership structure of many U.S. private equity funds, the
administration, portfolio management, and distribution of equity interests of a FIP are not
performed by a general partner. Instead they are performed by an independent legal entity
accredited with the CVM to engage in securities portfolio administration activities.151 The
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administrator is responsible for the legal representation of the FIP as well as for managing the
FIP’s routine activities, which include paying fees, receiving dividends and interest, preparing
financial statements and reports, signing shareholder agreements of companies in which the FIP is
a shareholder, providing reports and information to investors, and other activities established in
the FIP’s charter or determined by the quota holders’ general meeting.152
The quota holders who attend the general meeting are the key decision-makers in a FIP and
have exclusive authority over key matters such as the amendment of the charter, the removal of
the administrator, the merger or liquidation of the FIP, the issuance and distribution of new quotas,
the extension of the duration of the FIP, and the operation of the committees and administrative
bodies of the FIP.153 Resolutions of the general meeting generally require a majority vote of the
attendees, unless a supermajority vote is mandated by CVM Rule 391/03 or by the FIP’s charter.154
Certain FIPs also have internal committees and boards to enrich their decision-making processes
and to ensure informed decisions regarding the FIP’s investments and divestitures.155

More

complex FIPs might also have advisory boards and technical committees to advise on matters
pertaining to the industry or sector of each target company.156
viii.

Taxation of FIP and its Quota holders (PRE Jan. 1, 2018)

Prior to January 1, 2018, FIPs were generally exempt from income tax generated from
gains in their financial investments due to the FIP’s classification as a condominium under
Brazilian law.157 Contrarily, Brazilian tax law did not treat the target companies the FIP invested

152

See id. at 90–95.
Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128, at 22–23.
154
CVM Rule 391/01.
155
See id.
156
Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128, at 22–24.
157
Id. at 28–29; See also Latin Am. Private Equity & Venture Capital Ass’n., Private Equity Tax Benefits of Brazilian
FIPs, LAVCA (Sept. 8, 2009), http://lavca.org/2009/09/08/private-equity-tax-benefitsof-brazilian-fips/ [hereinafter
LAVCA].
153

29
in as tax-transparent, but rather taxed them as independent entities.158 “The fact that the FIP [was]
per se exempt from taxation on acquisitions and divestitures [made] it a very attractive vehicle for
private equity investment.”159 Moreover, the exempt treatment was extended to non-Brazilian
quota holders, which provided an extra incentive for foreign investors to use FIPs as investment
vehicles when investing in Brazil.160
In addition, dividends received by the FIP and forwarded directly to the quota holders were
not subject to the Brazilian withholding income tax (“WHT”).161 Nonetheless, interest on net
equity received by the FIP and repaid to quota holders as well as other payments made to FIP’s
quota holders domiciled in Brazil were subject to WHT at the rate of fifteen percent.162
Nevertheless, “WHT assessed on the income earned by non-resident investors arising from an
interest in a FIP as well as upon repatriation of the capital originally invested in the FIP are
currently subject to a zero percent rate, provided that certain conditions are met.”163 The above
tax treatment given to the FIP prior to January 1, 2018, helps explain, “why foreign private equity
feeder funds and other non-resident investors usually treat FIPs as the preferred vehicles for private
equity investments in Brazil.”164 Naturally, “savings from a zero reduction on the WHT levied on
income distributions made by the FIP may be crucial to determining the economic advisability of
an M&A transaction and allow private equity investors to maximize the value-capturing potential
of certain opportunities.”165
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ix.

Tax Post 2018166

The tax benefits found in the FIP changed on January 1, 2018, with the passage of
Provisional Measure No. 806/2017 (hereinafter “MP 806”), which established new rules regarding
the taxation of FIPs. Under MP 806, investors in FIPs qualified as investment entities are now
taxed via Withholding Income Tax (IRRF) on the sale of assets of the fund, at a rate of 15%.167
The taxation is based on the grounds of a fictitious distribution of income.168 FIPs not qualified
as an investment entity (Equity FIPs), are now taxed as legal entities and any earnings and income
not distributed by January 2, 2018, will undergo the same fictitious distribution and be taxed at a
15% rate.169
V.

Brazil Offers a More Competitive Landscape for Private Equity Because it Regulated in a
Manner That Supports Economic Growth by Creating Incentives for Private Investment
When the legal frameworks are compared some similarities become immediately

apparent. Consequently, the similarities in the regulations are addressed first, as well as why the
similarities appear. A subsequent section will discuss some of the major differences between the
two legal frameworks and will reach a conclusion as to why the differences exist. The last section
will focus solely on the legal frameworks from an investor’s perspective170 and conclude that
Brazil offers a more favorable regime for Private Equity investing compared to the European
Union.
i.

166

The Similarities Between Jurisdictions

There are potential Constitutional challenges to the new tax scheme for the FIP but those challenges will not be
addressed in this Comment.
167
See Provisional Measure No. 806/2017.
168
See Luiz Girotto and Tayron Karlos, Provisional Measure No. 806/2017 and the Impacts on Investment Funds,
GRIROTTO LEGAL MENTORING (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.girottoadv.com.br/en/provisional-measure-no-8062017and-the-impacts-on-investment-funds/.
169
See id.
170
This analysis will assume the investor is weighing two identical investments with the same risk and return potential
and is looking solely at the legal framework to determine where to invest.

31
After examining the above legal frameworks, certain similarities exist between Europe’s
private equity scheme and Brazil’s private equity scheme. These likenesses share an analogous
purpose and provide similar protections to the citizens of the respective jurisdictions. This
section will first look at the legislative reason behind limiting alternative investing to qualified
investors and restricting access to such investment vehicles. Second, this section will look at the
similarities in the reporting requirements for private equity funds and why these requirements
exist. Lastly, the similarities between the European Union and Brazil’s requirements for
structuring and governing a fund are examined.
Like most jurisdictions around the world, Brazil and the European Union restrict access to
alternative investment vehicles and only allow qualified investors to invest.171 While every
jurisdiction has a different definition of what defines a qualified investor,172 most all governments
forbid the general public from using alternative investment vehicles. This is because alternative
investment vehicles, such as private equity and hedge funds, carry a much greater risk for the
investor. Private equity funds derive their risk from their closed-ended structure.173 Close-ended
funds require investors to commit capital to a fund. This is referred to in the industry as committed
capital. Committed capital may be put towards a so-called blind pool where the investor does not
know specifically how or where the money is to be invested. Such an arrangement offers fund
managers leeway to make investments as they deem appropriate to generate high internal rates of
return for the investors.174
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When a fund pursues investments, such as an offering to acquire a business, the amount of
committed capital may be seen by the business owner as a way to gauge the ability of the fund to
follow through with the offer. As committed funds are called upon to make investments, the
contributing investors will be granted a portion of the overall returns the investment brings to the
fund.175 While committed capital does not indicate immediate liquidity, it can demonstrate a
fund’s capacity to pursue and fulfill deals.
Put simply, the main reason governments limit the general public’s access to alternative
investment vehicles is to protect individuals that they deems cannot bear the risk of making such
an investment.176 The global regulations restricting access to such investment vehicles and
unregistered security to the “Smart Money”177 is done by excluding the general public from the
marketplace based on arbitrary standards. “[T]hese smart-money approaches promote the dual
goals of capital formation and investor protection.”178 Currently, this approach is being used
around the world to protect citizens from taking financial risks they may not be able to bear if
the endeavor fails. It has been argued, however, that restricting the general populations’ access
to investment vehicles that generate the highest returns adds to the increasing financial inequality
in society today.179 Nonetheless, no jurisdiction has taken any action to expand alternative
investment vehicles to everyone.180
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Another similarity in the two legal frameworks is the basic reporting and disclosure
requirements. It is important to note that the specifics of the reporting requirements make the
jurisdictions vastly different and will be addressed in the following section.181
Both Brazil and the European Union require private equity funds to disclose certain
material information to investors.182 The primary purpose of the disclosure is to make sure the
fund’s investors have knowledge of any material changes taken by the fund manager or to ensure
the investors know of any material changes to the fund itself. Additionally, both jurisdictions
require funds to report certain information to the appropriate regulatory authorities.183 This is
done to certify that funds are not engaging in illegal activity.
Like the “smart money” requirements, the basic reporting and disclosure requirements
are standard and something every fund manager around the world must understand and adhere
to.
ii.

Differences Between Jurisdiction.

While the basic regulatory framework is similar, the laws could not be more different.
First, when Brazil was enacting the FIPs investment structure, it did so with the intent to
facilitate foreign private investment.184

Contrarily, the AIFMD aims to restrict foreign

investment in Europe.185 While these intentions are clear from the effects of the law, it must be
noted that within Europe there are competing thoughts on what market theory is best between
nations.186 The European Union is an intergovernmental organization therefore it must act in
accordance with the majorities wishes. This is a much greater challenge than governing a single
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state like Brazil because different government must come to an agreement before any change
may take place.
Another major difference between the regulations is that Brazil’s FIP program limits the
type of investments available to foreign private equity investors seeking to do business in
Brazil.187 In doing so, Brazil sought to insulate itself from many risks presented by the presence
of foreign capital.188

While investors have bypassed some of the restrictions by using

subsidiaries and holding companies, such roadblocks do deter some of the potential capital.189
Europe’s AIFMD contrarily does not restrict the type of investments that investors can make,
but rather subjects foreign investors to the heightened regulations all European fund managers
must abide by.190
Additionally, another major difference is the extraterritorial nature of the AIFMD. Like
many recent European Directives, the AIFMD has an extra territorial effect beyond the European
Union.

The AIFMD gives protection to all European domiciled investors, and requires

compliance from all European fund managers operating outside of the European Union.191 The
extraterritorial aspect presented in the AIFMD is becoming more common among European
Union regulations and is most present in the AIFMD’s marketing requirements.192 As explained
above, these rules limit the ability of a fund to market itself to new investors in Europe or to
investors with European citizenship. Such extraterritorial reach is not present in the Brazilian
regulation.193 This is likely due to the size of the market place and the government’s goal of
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increasing certain types of private investment in Brazil.194 Additionally, Brazil does not impose
any restrictions on fund marketing, other than the requirement that the fund only takes
investments from qualified investors.195
The final major difference between the regulations is that Brazil grants favorable tax
treatment to FIP investments. Prior to 2018, capital gains derived from FIPs investments were
taxed at 0%.196 This generated greater return for investors and allowed the investment to reach
alpha in a shorter time frame.197 This favorable tax treatment incentivized investors and lowered
the risk of FIPs investments in Brazil because the investment did not need to generate as much
money to create an acceptable return.198 This statement remains true even after the tax law
changed in 2018. While the investments are less favorable compared to an identical investment
at a 0% capital gain tax rate, the new rate (15%) are still reasonable when compared to other
global tax rates.199 The European Union, unlike Brazil, does not provide any special tax rates for
private equity investment. This is likely because to change any tax regulation, the European
Union must do so by a unanimous vote.200 Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the European
Union would ever make any change related to the tax treatment of investment income.
As illustrated above, Brazil’s FIPs offers investors a more favorable legal landscape. The
law creates a favorable tax rate for the investments and it does not restrict the funds’ ability to
market itself and find new investors. Even though the law restricts the types of investment that
qualify for FIPs, there are means to get around these restrictions. Thus, the restrictions become
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a slight deterrence, not an all-out bar. Brazil could make FIPs more appealing to foreign investors
if it allowed FIPs to invest in real estate development and/or it repealed the 2018 tax changes.
If the European Union wants to become a more investor friendly jurisdiction, it should
consider changing the fund marking requirements and making Passport Marketing available to
all. It should also consider reevaluating its standards on the use of leverage. In almost all
jurisdictions, funds can use more leverage than what is allowed under the AIFMD. Allowing
funds to leverage themselves helps increase the flow of capital into certain investments and
generates greater returns.

Considering investing in any alternative investment vehicle is

restricted to qualified investors, making such a change would be consistent with the existing
provisions. Lastly, there is no evidence that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by alternative
investment funds and their use of leverage. Thus, the imposition of such a drastic restriction
seems illogical.
VI.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Brazil, by legislating in a manner that sought to promote private investment
has created a much more investor friendly jurisdiction when compared to the European Union.
Additionally, while both jurisdictions could enact changes that would facilitate private
investing without impacting the investor protection created under the respective regulatory
frame works, Brazil is in the best position to do so because it already possesses a market making
mentality, unlike Europe where market shaping has a stronghold.

